This paper shows that, in the absence of a complete set of risk markets, prices provide incorrect signals for guiding production decisions. Even if all individuals have rational expectations concerning the distribution of prices which will prevail on the market next period, the market allocation is, in general, not a constrained Pareto optimum. Essentially the only conditions under which, for all technologies, the market equilibrium is a constrained Pareto optimum are those in which risk markets are redundant. We derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for redundancy of risk markets, which turn out to be extremely restrictive.
each state as given; these transfers are determined endogenously, as a result of the working of the market. This implies that there may be Pareto improvements from the imposition of investment taxes and subsidies. In addition, we consider some taxes (like ad valorem output taxes) which can be viewed as mechanisms by which the government coordinates allocations across states of nature, a kind of coordination, though plausible in practice, that Grossman does not allow his planners to undertake.
In this paper, we do not discuss alternative explanations of the absence of a complete set of markets. Short of such an explanation, there is always the concern that the proposed market intervention is infeasible for the same reason that the markets are incomplete.1 In this paper, we analyze a specific context in which equity markets are absent because output is not observable (other than to the farmer himself) but inputs are. Although in such an environment output taxes and subsidies would not be feasible, input taxes/subsidies would be, and, under certain circumstances, Pareto improvements can be effected even with these limited instruments.
II. A Simple Model with Identical Farmers and Consumers
We examine these questions within the context of the simplest possible model. There are two groups within the population: farmers and consumers. All farmers are identical, and all consumers are identical. We first describe the farmers' behavior, then consumers', and finally market equilibrium. In the next section, we define and analyze the constrained Pareto optimum and compare it with the market equilibrium.
Farmers
All farmers are identical and must choose the level of some decision variable, g, at the start of the season, before the state of nature, 0 (e.g., the weather), is known. Output, q, is an increasing function of g and 0, and is concave in e:
qn=fty (e, 0), fa rei 0,fo , 1 For instance, if the proposed policy intervention involves output taxes, the natural question to ask is, given that it is assumed that the value of output can be observed, is it not reasonable to introduce securities the payments on which are contingent on the value of output (equities)? And if these securities are introduced, would not the efficiency of the market be restored? It is important to observe that the introduction of equity markets would not alter the basic nonoptimality result (see Stiglitz, in press).
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If there are N farmers, aggregate output is Q=Nq Q(e,0).
Since all farmers are identical, we can represent the action taken by a single number (although in principle we should write down the action taken by each farmer). Each farmer takes the distribution of prices as given (this is the natural generalization of the price-taking assumption of the conventional nonstochastic model). Later, we shall discuss how this price distribution is determined. As we shall see, it will depend on the actions taken by all other farmers, the state of nature, and the income of the consumers I: 2 p = p (e, 61, I ).
The income of a farmer in state 0 when he takes action e is thus Y = Pf (6t 0).
We assume the farmer has a concave utility function which depends on both his income and the action he takes: U = U(y, et), Us, > O. UgyY < O. Use 0 .
(The marginal utility of income is positive but diminishing, and U is concave in A.) He chooses ( to maximize his expected utility max EU(y, ),
given expectations about prices, p((, 0, I), so that he sets E{Upfe + Ue} = 0.
Several special interpretations of this general model should be noted. In one interpretation, e is a choice of technique. In that case, we postulate that e changes the probability distribution of outcomes but does not directly affect utility, that is, Us = 0. A second interpretation has 6 as the level of investment or the cost of purchased inputs such as fertilizer. Then, net income of the farmer is y -g, and we write U = u(y -e). 
a function of price and the income of the representative consumer.
Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium price distribution is now easy to determine, given the demand function ( 
III. The Nonoptimality of Market Equilibrium
Introduction
We now wish to evaluate the market equilibrium described in the previous section. To do this, we need to compare the welfare of consumers and producers in the market equilibrium with that in some other feasible allocation. In making the comparison, however, we need to take into account the constraints on the set of markets. The set of (constrained) Pareto optima is described by the solution to where ca is the fraction of consumer income spent on the commodity, -q is the income elasticity of demand, and E is the (absolute value of the) elasticity of demand. Equation (14) , not yet ruled out the possibility that the Lagrangian has several critical points; the market equilibrium may correspond to one of these (so B = 0), but this may not be a global maximum. It is easy to establish the following theorem, however.
Theorem 1b.-A sufficient condition for the market to be constrained Pareto optimal is that 1 be concave in s and g and, at the market allocation, gull, B (g'1)-=0.
We shall show below that only under unusual circumstances will B -0 at the market equilibrium, and it follows that only under even more unusual circumstances will B = 0 at the market equilibrium and the market not be a constrained Pareto optimum.
We should point out that concavity of U ins and g, of V ins, and off in g is not sufficient to ensure the concavity of ?, as can be seen by twice differentiating S. However, for the logarithmic indirect utility function which plays a central role in the following analysis, concavity is ensured.
IV. Redundancy of Risk Markets and Constrained Pareto Optimality
In the previous subsection, we derived a simple condition which (together with the assumption of concavity) was both necessary and sufficient for the market equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto optimum. We need, however, to interpret this condition, to see under what circumstances it will be satisfied, in order to ascertain whether it is likely that the market equilibrium is a constrained Pareto optimum. The condition ( A special case of this arises when the marginal rates of substitution are the same state by state, that is, VI = XUs, for some value of X. In that case, of course, if risk markets were opened up, there would be no trade on them. We say that in these cases risk markets are redundant. We thus have an immediate corollary of theorem 1.
Theorem 2. -A sufficient condition for the constrained optimality of the market equilibrium is the redundancy of risk markets.
If risk markets are redundant, the market equilibrium is a full Pareto optimum.
We next ask three questions. i) Are there restrictions on the utility functions which, for all production functions, ensure the redundancy of risk markets?
ii) Are there weaker restrictions on the utility functions which, for all production functions, ensure the constrained optimality of market equilibrium? If there are not, then, in a sense, the conditions for risk market redundancy are both necessary and sufficient for the constrained optimality of the market.
iii) Are there reasonable restrictions on the technology which, together with some weak restrictions on the utility functions, ensure the constrained Pareto optimality of the market?
The first question is easy to answer: There are a set of (fairly restrictive) assumptions under which (in our simple model) risk markets are always redundant. These conditions are set out below in Section V.
The second question is more difficult to answer but provides one of our key results: In Section VI we are able to show that redundancy of risk markets is both necessary and sufficient for the market equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto optimum for all technologies. It turns out that constrained Pareto optimality is critically as strong a condition as full Pareto optimality.
The final question is the most difficult, and Section VII provides some insight into it. 
These results are important in identifying the special set of circumstances in which the market attains not only a constrained Pareto optimum but a full Pareto optimum.
VI. Necessary Conditions for Constrained Pareto Optimality
The sufficient conditions for the full optimality of the market are, of course, very restrictive. We wish to know whether there are other conditions which will lead the market equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto optimum. For particular values of the parameters, the market might happen to be a constrained Pareto optimum. But a small perturbation of any of the functions involved in the analysis-the consumer's utility function, the producer's utility function, the probability distribution of states, or the production function-might destroy the constrained Pareto optimality of market equilibrium.
We establish here that the necessary conditions for the market equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto optimum for all technologies OPTIMALITY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 235 are exactly the same as the conditions for redundancy of risk markets. We establish this by looking at a special subset of technologies. There are only two states of nature, which occur with probability vT and 1 -IT. There is a transformation curve facing each farmer, q2= T(q1),
where qi = output in state i, i = 1, 2. The choice of technique has no direct effect on utility, Ue = 0. For notational simplicity, we let pi, yi, U', and so on equal price, income, and marginal utility of income in state i, and we use dashes for derivatives. The farmer's first-order condition (7) becomes 
Equation (29) 
VII. Restrictions on Technology Which Ensure Optimality
The previous section established that, without restrictions on the technology, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of the market equilibrium were precisely the conditions for the redundancy of risk markets. If we impose restrictions on the set of technologies, then we can obtain constrained Pareto optimality under conditions which are weaker, but only slightly so. Using the kinds of techniques used to prove theorems 2-5 we can establish the following theorem.4 (34) (which includes the constant demand elasticity as a special case), then a necessary condition for constrained optimality is either that risk markets be (locally) redundant or that there be multiplicative risk.
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VIII. The Magnitude of the Distortions
In previous sections we have established conditions required for the market equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto optimum. We would like to be able to assess the magnitude and direction by which the optimal value of 4 differs from the market equilibrium value. To do this we define X(g) = Upfe + Us. The optimal choice of I, ?, must satisfy equation (13'), which we rewrite as
EX(?) = -B( W). (35)
In contrast, from (7) EX(g'm) = 0.
The left-hand side of equation (35) can be expanded about the market choice of technique, gm, to find the direction and magnitude of the bias away from the constrained efficient allocation:
In order to interpret this result, it is necessary to decide how best to parameterize the choice of technique, 4. One natural method is to let 4 measure the standard deviation (or perhaps the coefficient of variation) of output, in which case equation (36) will measure the extent to which the farmers choose insufficiently risky production, and the right-hand side will typically depend on the degree of risk aversion and the extent to which mean output increases as more risky techniques are employed. Rather than derive various measures of the bias, it might be more useful to illustrate the method for the two-state example of Section VI. Moreover, the fundamental issue is how large is the loss of welfare that results from the market's failure to achieve a constrained Pareto optimum relative to the likely welfare gains to be derived from specific policy intervention (such as price stabilization), which we can calculate once the model has been fully specified. Consider the special case in which there are equally probable states of the world, and the production trade-off between output in the two states of the world is linear: q2 = T(qj) = a -bqj, b > 1. Although this expression is of the order ( 0.11)2, it should be remembered that if R" is not too large, /3 = a(1 -R") is small, since the expenditure share, a, for most commodities is very small. Thus, for this particular parameterization, the welfare loss associated with the production inefficiencies from incomplete markets will be small if consumers risk aversion is not too large. If it is, the loss may be significant. In the more general case, the welfare loss will depend not only on the magnitude of consumers' risk aversion but also on that of producers and the elasticity of demand (see Newbery and Stiglitz, in press).
IX. Optimal Corrective Tax Policy
The allocation described in Section III could be attained if the government could directly control g, the choice of technique. One interpretation of our finding is that the fundamental decentralization theorem does not hold in the absence of a complete set of risk markets, for it is not possible to achieve the constrained efficient 24( JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY allocation on competitive markets using only lump-sum taxes. Since direct control is evidently impractical, it is necessary to inquire whether there are tax policies which allow the constrained optimum to be decentralized. This question raises some subtle issues. For example, if the government levies an ad valorem tax on producers, its tax revenue will depend on the state of the world, and we must ask whether its budget is to be balanced in each state of the world or only on the average. In the former case, the lump-sum transfer will vary with the state of the world, while in the latter case purchasing power will vary. It can, however, be shown that regardless of the restrictions on feasible tax policies it is, in general, possible to make Pareto improvements.
Let us consider the simplest case in which the government budget must balance state by state and taxes can be at either constant ad valorem rates or lump sum. We now establish the following theorem.
Theorem 9a. -A constant ad valorem tax rate (the proceeds of which are distributed as lump-sum payments to producers), Pareto improvements may even be attainable (under somewhat more restrictive conditions) if the government is further restricted in its instruments. Consider, for instance, the case where 4 has the interpretation as the level of investment, and where producers' utility function, accordingly, is written U = U(pf + s -a). Now assume that g is observable, and the government imposes an investment tax at the rate r with proceeds, rg, distributed to producers as lump-sum payments. Assume, moreover, that the government provides an additional lump-sum subsidy (tax) so that producers' expected utility is left unchanged. Producers will now set EU'pfe = EU'(1 + r), and the required subsidy 5A is such that (at r 0)
where dpldr is the total derivative of price with respect to the change in policy. The effect of this policy on the representative consumer is given by E[V,(dp/dr) -V1(ds/dr)J, where s is the per capita tax on consumers to finance the producer subsidy. Using Roy's identity, (8), and (45), we observe that dV ? as EVif(dpldT) _ EUf(dp/dr) d~~r EV1 EU'
It is immediate from our earlier analysis that the only conditions under which equality will hold (for all technologies) will be those in which risk markets are redundant; otherwise, there always exists an investment tax or subsidy, accompanied by a lump-sum tax or subsidy, which leaves producers unaffected and improves consumers welfare. Under more restrictive conditions, a lump-sum transfer from consumers to producers (or conversely), unaccompanied by a production tax or subsidy, may constitute a Pareto improvement.
X. Imperfectly Correlated Output Risk
We shall now show that if farmers do not have perfectly correlated outputs, then, even under the stringent conditions in which the market allocation is a constrained Pareto optimum with perfect correlation, the market allocation is unlikely to be a constrained Pareto optimum. We prove the following theorems. Theorem 1Qa. -A sufficient condition for constrained Pareto optimality with imperfectly correlated returns is the redundancy of risk markets.
Theorem lOb.-Necessary and sufficient conditions for redundancy of risk markets for all technologies are that all farmers be risk neutral and VIP = 0. Theorem lOc. If the economy is to be a constrained Pareto optimum for all technologies, all farmers must be risk neutral and VIP 0.
The first theorem is obvious: If risk markets are redundant, the economy in fact attains a first-best optimum. Sufficiency in the second theorem is also fairly trivial. If the marginal rates of substitution between any two states are the same for all individuals, clearly risk markets will be redundant; and they will be the same if the marginal utility of income of all individuals is constant. But if all farmers are risk neutral and V1p = 0, clearly, the marginal utility of all producers and all consumers is constant.
Necessity is only slightly more difficult to establish. If risk markets are to be redundant, the marginal rates of substitution between income in different states of nature must be the same for all farmers; that is, letting Uj(yi) represent the utility of' the jth farmer as a function of his income, yj, we require that UJ /Uk be constant. Differ- This says that a necessary condition for the constrained Pareto optimality of the market is that a particular weighted average of marginal rates of substitution of producers and consumers be the same.
Since, from theorem 4, we already know that if the market is to be a constrained Pareto optimum for all perfectly correlated technologies, either farmers must be risk neutral and VI, = 0 or consumers must have logarithmic utility functions, in order to establish theorem lOc all we need to do is to show that, for the logarithmic utility function, if returns are not perfectly correlated, for some technologies (48) Given this symmetry in production, it is natural to assume symmetry in social weight, Xi = Xk = X. The optimal lump-sum subsidy to the ith producer is derived as in Section III. We obtain, as the counterpart to equation ( 
XI. Conclusions
This paper has shown that even when individuals have rational expectations-they have fully absorbed all the information which is available on the market and they use it efficiently in making their production decisions the market equilibrium is, in general, not even a constrained Pareto optimum. Specific biases have been identified, in the context of some simple models, but in more general situations, the exact nature of the inefficiency may be hard to ascertain. The force of our argument is that there is no presumption that market equilibria are efficient; indeed, there is a strong presumption that the market equilibrium is not a constrained Pareto optimum.
In a sense, these results should not be surprising: When there is not a complete set of markets, farmers will not have the right prices to use in making their production decisions. Farmers pay attention only to their own marginal rates of substitution across states of nature. In general, these will differ from those of consumers because there is no market to bring them into equality and, hence, the market allocation will not be Pareto optimal.
There is another way of looking at these results which may prove instructive. In a world of complete markets, insurance markets allocate risk, and goods markets allocate goods; but in the absence of insurance markets, the remaining goods markets have to serve both functions. For example, if the source of the variability lies on the supply side, and if demand is not too inelastic, the negative correlation between price and output means that the output market transfers some of the risk facing producers to consumers, and producers' income variability will be less than their output variability. In a rational expectations equilibrium, each farmer correctly forecasts the distribution of prices and chooses the level and riskiness of output to maximize his expected utility. Together, these output decisions generate a distribution of total supply which in turn generates the price distribution. No one farmer can influence the price distribution, but each one is affected by it, and, collectively, their actions reproduce it. The price distribution is, therefore, a public good, or collective consumption good, and its form affects the level and distribution of income risk. However, we already know that the competitive market will, in general, fail to induce the optimum level of supply of public goods, so it should come as no surprise that the output market does not, in general, induce the optimum level of income risk.
If an omniscient planner were to decide on the choice of technique, he would take account of the effect of supply on the price distribution and, hence, on the distribution of risk. Insurance markets in this context transform a public good (the whole price distribution) into a set of private goods (one price for output in each state of the world). Notice that the one-commodity world popular in early risk analysis is very special, because income and output risk are the same, and there is no public good element of a collectively produced price distribution.
There were basically two cases where the market allocation was optimal. In the first, consumers had unitary price elasticity and all farmers were identical. This meant that farmers faced no income risk. They thus maximized their expected income. This coincides with what consumers would like farmers to maximize, since price is pro-portional to the marginal utility of consumption of the given commodity.
In the second case, farmers are risk neutral and again maximize expected income. As before, this would coincide with consumers' objectives, if price were proportional to the marginal utility of consumption of the commodity. However, this time the marginal utility to consumers of increasing output and hence consumption, Q, in some state of nature is UQ = PV1, and this is proportional to price, p, if VI does not vary with p, that is, VIp = 0, so that consumers are price risk neutral.
When there is more than one type of farmer, that is, when the output of different farms is not perfectly correlated, these simple relationships between output and income which we have assumed above will not prevail. Even with unitary price elasticity, farmers will still face income risk and, hence, will not maximize the value of their output, so that even if consumers' marginal utility of consumption were proportional to price, as with the logarithmic utility function, consumers interests would not be maximized by farmers. The only general condition which ensures optimality is that consumers are price risk neutral and farmers are income risk neutral.
Some readers have found the following alternative interpretation of the nonoptimality of the market allocation instructive. Except under unusual conditions (described in the text), the absence of a full set of risk markets implies that the marginal rate of substitution between income in different states of nature differs between consumers and producers. Consider a production decision which increases output in one state and decreases it in another. The market allocation is made, as we have emphasized, with producers assuming the price distribution is given. Now, by increasing output in one state and decreasing it in another. the price will increase in one state and decrease in the other; if the elasticity of demand is less than unity, producers will be better off in the first and worse off in the second, while consumers will be better off in the first and worse off in the second. It is clear that such a marginal change can reduce the difference between consumers' and producers' marginal rates of substitution between the two states; thus, this production decision can serve as a partial substitute for the risk market which is absent.
The important point is that it is only under very special circumstances that the market allocation will attain even the weak sense of optimality implicit in our notion of constrained Pareto optimality. This, in turn, has some important implications; there is, for instance, a widespread belief that international buffer-stock schemes for the stabilization of prices of agricultural commodities are unnecessary and undesirable, since the market provides an "efficient" level of 246 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY storage.5 Our analysis shows that this particular argument against such schemes is not valid; indeed there is a presumption that the market does not provide an efficient level of storage when there is an incomplete set of risk markets.
More generally, we have shown that, in general, there exists some tax policy which would generate a Pareto-optimal improvement over existing market allocations. Our results suggest, moreover, that the tax would depend sensitively on the specific form of production and utility functions, while the calculations of Section VIII suggest that, if risk aversion is not too large, the quantitative gain from such policies may not be significant. Thus, while there is a strong presumption that the market is not a constrained Pareto optimum, the desirability of government intervention remains a moot question.
